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A distinct aspect of the sense of fairness in humans is that we care not only about equality in material rewards but also about equality in
nonmaterial values. One such value is the opportunity to choose freely among many options, often regarded as a fundamental right to
economic freedom. In modern developed societies, equal opportunities in work, living, and lifestyle are enforced by antidiscrimination
laws. Despite the widespread endorsement of equal opportunity, no studies have explored how people assign value to it. We used
functional magnetic resonance imaging to identify the neural substrates for subjective valuation of equality in choice opportunity.
Participants performed a two-person choice task in which the number of choices available was varied across trials independently of
choice outcomes. By using this procedure, wemanipulated the degree of equality in choice opportunity between players and dissociated
it from the value of reward outcomes and their equality.We found that activation in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) tracked
the degree to which the number of options between the two players was equal. In contrast, activation in the ventral striatum tracked the
number of options available to participants themselves but not the equality between players. Our results demonstrate that the vmPFC, a
key brain region previously implicated in the processing of social values, is also involved in valuation of equality in choice opportunity
between individuals. These findingsmay provide valuable insight into the human ability to value equal opportunity, a characteristic long
emphasized in politics, economics, and philosophy.
Key words: neuroeconomics; reward system; social comparison
Introduction
Opportunities to choose freely, whether over health care, mar-
riage partners, or political representatives, are considered a fun-
damental human right in most developed and democratic
societies (Inglehart et al., 2008; Delhey, 2009; Welzel and Ingle-
hart, 2010). However, inequality in opportunity to choose is also
a pervasive feature of many societies and cultures. Historical ex-
amples include slavery, voting restrictions, political participa-
tion, civil rights, marriage, apartheid, and segregation. Struggles
to equalize freedom to choose can span decades and require ex-
traordinary efforts by historical figures, such as Martin Luther
King, Nelson Mandela, and Aung San Suu Kyi (Kennedy, 1989;
Silverstein, 1996; Brookfield, 2008).Modern examples exist, such
as societal debates over same-sexmarriage and women’s rights to
choose in many countries. These examples also remind us that
equality in opportunity is not universally accepted for all choices,
by all people and societies.
There is an important distinction between equality in oppor-
tunity and equality in outcome, which are different dimensions
of social equality (Arneson, 1989; Roemer, 2002; Breen, 2010).
Humans are unique in having developed social systems that value
equality in opportunity (Be´teille, 1986, 1994; Flemming et al.,
2006).Modern developed societies seem to generallymore clearly
and universally value equality in opportunity than equality in
outcomes (Marshall et al., 1999; Breen, 2010). Of course, equal
opportunities do not ensure equal outcomes. However, inequal-
ity in outcomes is tolerated, and even celebrated, if it results from
fair competition based on equal opportunity (Marshall et al.,
1999).
Despite these examples of the apparent societal importance of
equality in opportunity, previous studies have exclusively fo-
cused onneural underpinnings of equality in outcomes (Sanfey et
al., 2003; Tabibnia et al., 2008; Tricomi et al., 2010; Baumgartner
et al., 2011). Our study is the first to investigate the neural basis
of people’s subjective valuation of equality in opportunity to
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choose, using functionalmagnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). To
disentangle the effect of equality in opportunity from that of
equality in outcome, we developed a novel task derived from the
economic theories that characterize the value of opportunity of
choice based on the sheer number of options available, regardless
of the value of outcome (Pattanaik and Xu, 1990; Kranich, 1996).
In this “two-person choice task” (Fig. 1A), the numbers of op-
tions available to a participant (“SELF”) and a confederate
(“OTHER”)were individuallymanipulated on a trial-by-trial ba-
sis, which yielded equal and unequal social situations in terms of
their opportunities to choose. Of note, the probability of obtain-
ing a reward outcome was fixed regardless of the numbers of
options available.We focused on the neural activity in the ventral
striatum (VS) and ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC),
which are known to be involved in value processing (Fliessbach et
al., 2007; Behrens et al., 2009; Kringelbach and Berridge, 2009;
Mobbs et al., 2009; Haber and Knutson, 2010; Clithero et al.,
2011; Bartra et al., 2013). We predicted that these regions would
be responsive to the value represented by the number of options,
even though it was not associated with monetary value in and of
itself.
Materials andMethods
Participants.Twenty-three undergraduates participated in the study after
providing written informed consent. Two females did not complete the
experiment due to time constraints. Onemale completed the experiment
butwas excluded from the analysis because of excessive headmotion (2
mm) during the main task. The remaining 20 participants (8 females, 12
males; mean age, 20.8 years; range, 19–23; SD 1.28) were included in
the analysis. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision
and had no history of psychiatric illness or neurological disease. The
study was approved by the ethical committee of Tamagawa University.
Two-person choice task. Participants were instructed to perform a two-
person choice task with another person, who was actually a confederate
and his/her choices were determined by the computer. The task was
designed to dissociate the numbers of options for players from the prob-
ability of obtaining a reward outcome. A trial (Fig. 1A) started with the
presentation of an “opportunity stimulus,” which signaled the numbers
of options available to a participant (SELF) and a confederate (OTHER).
The colors indicating the option numbers for SELF and OTHER were
counterbalanced across participants. After a 3–7 s randomized interval,
positions of options available to the players were displayed, and partici-
pants had to choose one of the available options within 4 s. The option
chosen by participants was highlighted, and after a short delay (0.8–1.6 s)
the confederate’s choice was also displayed. After a 2 s interval, reward
outcomes for SELF and OTHER were displayed for 5 s. Outcomes were
either 1000 yen (“reward,” indicated by a face card) or 0 yen (“no re-
ward,” indicated by a deuce). In all trials, two of the four cards were face
cards, so that the probability of a reward outcome was 50% regardless of
the number of options available. The intertrial interval (ITI) was ran-
domized from 3 to 7 s.
There were 1, 2, or 4 available options for SELF andOTHER, indepen-
dently manipulated on a trial-by-trial basis, resulting in nine (3  3)
conditions for the opportunity stimulus (Fig. 1B). The degree of equality
in opportunity to choose (hereafter referred to as “choice equality”) was
defined on the basis of how small the difference in the numbers of op-
tions between the two players was, regardless of the outcomes of their
choices (Fig. 1C). For example, the choice equality was defined to be
highest when the two players had the same numbers of options available
(Arneson, 1989; Kranich, 1996). Each opportunity–stimulus condition
was repeated 12 times in the scanner (108 trials in total). The outcomes
for SELF and OTHER (either reward or no reward) were determined
independent of the opportunity–stimulus conditions, resulting in four
(2  2) conditions for the outcome. Unbeknownst to participants, the
outcomes for the players were controlled by the computer to balance the
actual frequencies of a reward outcome among the nine opportunity–
Figure 1. Two-person choice task. A, A trial started with the presentation of an “opportunity stimulus” that indicated the number of choice options available to a participant (SELF) and
confederate (OTHER). During the subsequent decision period, each player chose one of the options available to them (the confederate’s choice was actually determined by computer). The reward
outcomes of their choiceswere indicated by cards (a face cardwas associatedwithmonetary rewardswhereas a deucewas associatedwith no reward). In the example shown in the figure, there are
two options available to the participant, and four to the confederate. Upon choice, the participant’s chosen option is highlighted, followed by the revealed choice of the confederate, followed by
simultaneous showing of both of their outcomes (“no reward” for the participant and “reward” for the confederate in this case).B, Opportunity-stimulus conditions. The numbers of choice options
for SELF and OTHERweremanipulated independently. C, The regressionmodel used to analyze the neural responses to the opportunity stimuli. The 3 3matrices represent the nine opportunity-
stimulus conditions shown in B. The same model was also used to analyze subjective emotional pleasantness (Fig. 2B). The coefficients indicate how the dependent variables (R(s, o): the neural
responses or subjective emotional pleasantness) of an individual are sensitive to (1) the number of available options for the participant (OP_SELF), (2) those for the confederate (OP_OTHER), and (3)
the “choice equality” or the degree of equality in the numbers of available options between the two players (OP_EQUAL), quantified using the absolute value of their difference.
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stimulus conditions. This ensured that the number of options had indeed
no effect on the expected value of the outcome. Note that this task in-
volved no direct competition between the players. In the decision phase,
participants could choose any one of the available options regardless of
whether it was also available to the confederate; in the outcome phase,
both players could be rewarded individually (rather than sharing a re-
ward) when they had chosen the same option that was revealed to be a
reward outcome.
MID task. Participants also performed the monetary incentive delay
(MID) task to help us independently localize regions sensitive to mone-
tary reward (Knutson et al., 2001; Kuhl et al., 2010; Zaki et al., 2011). Each
trial started with an 800 ms cue indicating the amount of potential mon-
etary gain or loss (neutral: 0 yen; low gain: 20 yen; high gain: 400
yen; low loss: 10 yen; high loss: 200 yen; 20 trials for each cue),
followed by a fixation cross (2.0–2.5 s). A white square (“target”) was
then presented for 100–700 ms, and participants had to press a button
before the target disappeared. Subsequently, a feedbackmessage indicat-
ing whether participants successfully responded or not (“hit” or “miss”;
accompanied by the amount of gain/loss in the trial) was presented for
800 ms. In gain trials, participants earned the indicated money for a hit
response, but earned no money for a miss response. In loss trials, they
avoided losing the indicatedmoney for a hit response but lost the money
for a miss response. The ITI was jittered between 2.0 and 4.0 s.
To equate the task performance (hit rates) across participants, we
adjusted task difficulty for each participant by adaptively changing the
duration of the target presentation: if the participant’s hit rate after the
nth trial was 66%, the duration of target presentation (initialized to
250 ms) for the next trial was decreased by 25 ms (minimum: 100 ms); if
the hit rate after the nth trial was	66%, the target duration for the next
trial was increased by 25 ms (maximum: 700 ms). This procedure en-
sured that a participant’s hit rate was
66% (Knutson et al., 2001; Kuhl
et al., 2010; Zaki et al., 2011).
Experimental procedure. The experiment consisted of four phases: (1)
pretask instruction, (2) fMRI scan for themain task, (3) postscan subjec-
tive ratings, and (4) the second fMRI scan for the MID task. Participants
were first introduced to a same-sex confederate. Participants and the
confederate were recruited from different universities and had nevermet
each other before. Both the participant and confederate received the
instructions, but they did notmeet again after the participant entered the
scanner.
During the instructions, participants were told that the positions of
available options and the face cards (associated with reward outcomes)
were independently determined at random in each trial so that no effec-
tive strategy could be learned. In addition, to avoid forming the incorrect
belief that the probability of a reward outcome
depended on the number of options, we explic-
itly told participants that it was always 50% for
both players, regardless of the numbers of
available options. Furthermore, to confirm
whether they correctly understood the task in-
structions, participants were asked to fill in the
blanks of the following question:
“Given the fact that the number of the face
cards is always _ out of the 4 cards, the probabil-
ity that you obtain a reward outcome in a trial is
_%, regardless of the number of options avail-
able. Likewise, the probability that the other
player obtains a reward outcome is _%.”
All participants answered correctly (2, 50,
and 50), indicating that they clearly under-
stood this point before the fMRI scan. In the
instruction phase, participants and the confed-
erate were seated face-to-face at a table and
performed several practice trials to make par-
ticipants believe that they were playing the
game with another person. Participants were
told that the amount of a reward per trial in the
practice was set to 500 yen (one-half of that in
the actual experiment) and that the players
could earn somemoney depending on the out-
comes of three randomly selected trials. In actuality, the outcomes were
controlled by the computer and the payoffs for participants and the
confederate were always 500 and 1000 yen, respectively. The difference in
their payoffs was intended to make participants more sensitive to the
existence of the confederate while they performed the main task in the
scanner.
After the instruction phase, participants entered the MRI scanner and
performed the main task. The task was organized into three 13 min
sessions, each consisting of 36 trials. Participants were told before the
scan that the outcomes of three randomly chosen trials (one from each
session) would actually be paid to them. Thus, each participant had a
chance to earn 0–3000 yen. In fact, the payment for the main task was
fixed for all participants (1000 yen) so as not to influence the results of the
subsequent MID task.
After the scan, participants completed a self-report questionnaire as-
sessing the subjective emotions (happiness, sadness, anger, and disgust)
to the opportunity stimuli. The question was “how did you feel (happy,
sad, angry, or disgusted) when you saw the opportunity stimuli?” Partic-
ipants rated their emotions for each of the nine opportunity stimuli using
a 7 point scale (1  not at all, 7  extremely). The raw ratings were
transformed intoZ-scores for each participant and emotion to normalize
individual differences in the use of rating scales (Hare et al., 2010). The
resulting scores were aggregated across the scales to produce a composite
measure [happiness (sadness anger disgust)], which was used for
the analysis of subjective rating data (Fig. 2). The Z-scores of the nine
opportunity stimuli showed a similar pattern across the four subscales
(Pearson correlation coefficients between any two subscales: r ranged
from 0.52 to 0.86; mean r 0.70, p	 0.05), which validated the use of
the composite measure. We refer to this measure as “subjective emo-
tional pleasantness.” Participants were also asked to answer the perceived
probability (percentage of all trials) of face-card appearance for each of
the four option positions. Their answers were used to analyze the poten-
tial influence of perceived variance in option values on the value of the
number of options (see Results).
After a short break, participants received an instruction for the MID
task, and re-entered the scanner. The MID task was separated into two
sessions (50 trials per session). Participants were told that the payment
for the MID task was the sum of the outcomes of all trials. The actual
payment for the MID task was 4620 yen for all participants.
fMRI data acquisition. Functional imaging was conducted using a
3-tesla Siemens Trio A Tim MRI scanner. Interleaved T2*-weighted
gradient-echo echo-planar imaging (EPI) sequences were used to obtain
functional images (42 slices, 3 3 mm 3 mm voxels, field-of-view
Figure 2. Sensitivity of subjective emotional pleasantness on the numbers of options available. A, Self-reported emotional
pleasantness of opportunity stimuli. Participants rated the subjective emotional pleasantness of each of the nine combinations of
the opportunity stimuli immediately after the scan. B, The effects on the subjective emotional pleasantness of the number of
options for SELF (OP_SELF), that for OTHER (OP_OTHER), and the equality in optionnumbers (i.e., choice equality) between the two
players (OP_EQUAL, quantified using the absolute value of the difference between self and other options). Error bars depict SEM;
*p	 0.05 (one-sample t test, two-tailed).
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192mm2, 64 64matrix, slice gap 0mm, repetition time 2500ms,
echo time  25 ms, flip angle  90°). Slice orientation was tilted 30°
from the anterior commissural–posterior commissural line to reduce the
signal dropout in the vmPFC (Deichmann et al., 2003). A high-
resolution anatomical T1-weighted image (1  1  1 mm) was also
acquired for each participant.
fMRI data preprocessing.Data were analyzed using Statistical Paramet-
ric Mapping (SPM8, Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience,
Institute of Neurology, London, UK; http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/).
The first three volumes of each scanning session were discarded before
data processing to allow for stabilization of the magnetization. Images
were corrected for slice acquisition time within each volume, motion-
corrected with realignment to the first volume, spatially normalized to
the standardMontrealNeurological Institute EPI template (resampled to
3 3 3 mm voxels), and spatially smoothed using a Gaussian kernel
with a full-width at half-maximum of 8 mm.
fMRI data analysis. For each participant, the blood–oxygen level-
dependent (BOLD) responses were modeled with general linear models
(GLMs). Trial-related regressors were convolved with a canonical hemo-
dynamic response function provided by SPM8. For the main task, the
GLM included the following parametric regressors: (1) presentation of
the opportunity stimulus, modulated by (a) the number of available
options for SELF, (b) that for OTHER, and (c) the choice equality (Fig.
1C); and (2) presentation of the reward outcomes, modulated by (a) the
outcome for SELF (reward  1, no reward  0), (b) that for OTHER
(reward  1, no reward  0), and (c) the equality in the outcomes
between the players (equal outcome  1, unequal outcome  0). This
model yielded six  values of interest (OP_SELF, OP_OTHER, OP_EQUAL
for activation responding to opportunity stimuli; OU_SELF, OU_OTHER,
OU_EQUAL for activation responding to reward outcomes). The model
also included the following regressors of no interest: the decision period
(with duration of reaction time) and presentation of the confederate’s
choice. The regressor for the decision period and the regressor for pre-
sentation of the confederate’s choice were parametrically modulated by
the number of options for SELF, that for OTHER, and the degree of
equality in the option numbers between the players (identical to the
regressor for the opportunity stimulus). A regressor for error trials and
six motion parameters were also included in the model.
For theMID task, the GLM included the following regressors of inter-
est: (1) presentation of the cue, modulated by potential monetary gain
(neutral 0, low gain 1, high gain 2); (2) presentation of the gain
outcome; and (3) presentation of the no-gain outcome. The model also
included the following regressors of no interest: presentation of the cues
in the loss trials (low-loss and high-loss cues) and presentation of the
outcomes in the loss trials (loss and no-loss outcomes). The loss trials
were not used for localizing the reward systems in accordance with pre-
vious studies (Kuhl et al., 2010). A regressor for error trials and six mo-
tion parameters were also included in the model.
Because we had a priori hypothesis focusing on the activations of the
reward system (i.e., the VS and vmPFC), the second-level group analysis
was performed for the voxels within these regions identified by the inde-
pendent reward-localizer task (i.e., the MID task). First, we created ana-
tomical masks encompassing the VS and vmPFC, using the Automated
Anatomical Labeling atlas of the WFU Pickatlas toolbox for SPM
(Tzourio-Mazoyer et al., 2002; Maldjian et al., 2003). The mask for the
VS consisted of the bilateral caudate and putamen and bounded caudally
at y  0 to include only the anterior parts of the striatum (Izuma et al.,
2010). The mask for the vmPFC consisted of the bilateral medial orbito-
frontal gyrus and gyrus rectus (FitzGerald et al., 2012; Janowski et al.,
2013;Murayama et al., 2013). Second, within these anatomicalmasks, we
identified the peak activation voxels responding to monetary rewards
during the MID task (determined by a second-level group analysis). For
the VS, we selected a voxel showing the maximum effect of potential
monetary gains, identified using the parametric regressor for the cue
(Kuhl et al., 2010). For the vmPFC, we selected a voxel showing the
maximum effect in the contrast of monetary gain versus no-gain outcome
(Kuhl et al., 2010). Third, we averaged the neural  values (OP_SELF,
OP_OTHER, OP_EQUAL, OU_SELF, OU_OTHER, and OU_EQUAL) within a
6-mm-radius sphere surrounding each of these activation peaks, and
performed a one-sample t test (vs 0). The variables followed a normal
distribution (p  0.235, Kolmogorov–Smirnov test). This procedure
ensured that the selection of the voxels and subsequent analysis were
statistically independent.We also performed an exploratory whole-brain
analysis for completeness, with a height threshold of p	 0.05, corrected
for familywise error (FWE) across whole brain.
Brain-behavior correlations. Neural betas (OP_SELF, OP_OTHER, and
OP_EQUAL) for individual participants were averaged within the same
6-mm-radius spheres used in the group-average analysis. Behavioral be-
tas were obtained by submitting the subjective-rating data (the compos-
ite measure) to the same three-factor regression model used in the
analysis of the neural responses to the opportunity stimuli (Fig. 1C). The
variables derived from subjective ratings followed a normal distribution
(p  0.230). Relations between the neural  and subjective emotional
pleasantness  were examined using Pearson correlations.
Results
Subjective emotional pleasantness
We first examined self-reported emotional ratings for various
choice opportunities. Participants rated their subjective emo-
tional pleasantness (see Materials and Methods for details) of
each of the nine opportunity stimuli (Fig. 1B) immediately after
the scan. Although the probabilities of the reward outcome were
the same for all conditions, and participants were explicitly in-
formed of this fact before the scan, the subjective emotional
pleasantness of the opportunity stimuli varied significantly across
conditions (Fig. 2A). To examine the effects of the numbers of
options quantitatively, we analyzed the subjective emotional
pleasantness of each participant using a three-factor regression
model (Fig. 1C). This model assessed the dependencies of the
individual subjective emotional pleasantness on (1) the number
of options for SELF, (2) the number of options for OTHER, and
(3) the choice equality, or the degree of equality in the numbers of
options between SELF and OTHER (Fig. 2B). The regression
showed that subjective emotional pleasantness became more
positive as the choice equality increased (OP_EQUAL: t(19) 2.69,
p 0.015, one-sample t test), and they became more negative as
the number of options for OTHER increased (OP_OTHER: t(19)
2.27, p  0.035). The number of options for SELF had no
significant effect (OP_SELF: t(19) 1.08, p 0.294), possibly due
to large interindividual variation (the variance of OP_SELF dif-
fered significantly from that of OP_OTHER; 
2
(1)  24.1, p 	
0.001, likelihood-ratio test for equivalence of variances). These
results suggest that the subjective emotional pleasantness of
choice opportunity is substantially modulated by social compar-
ison of the number of available options. In particular, the choice
equality between individuals had a positive effect on subjective
emotional pleasantness. It is also notable that the subjective emo-
tional pleasantness OP_SELF and OP_OTHER were negatively cor-
related across participants (r0.55, p 0.012), indicating that
the more individuals valued their own choice opportunities, the
more they tended to devalue the other player’s. The subjective
emotional pleasantness OP_EQUAL was not correlated with
OP_SELF (r0.05, p 0.826) or with OP_OTHER (r0.11,
p 0.655).
Neural response to reward outcome
Before analyzing the neural responses to the opportunity stimuli,
we confirmed that the reward-coding voxels identified by the
independent reward-localizer task (activation peaks: x 15, y
11, z  5 for the VS; Fig. 3A; x  9, y  44, z  14 for the
vmPFC; Fig. 4A) also responded to the reward outcome during
the two-person choice task. The neural responses to the reward
outcomes were analyzed based on a three-factor model that sep-
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arated the effects of the outcome for SELF, that for OTHER, and
equality in the outcomes between the players (see Materials and
Methods). As expected, both the VS and vmPFCwere sensitive to
the reward outcome for SELF (Table 1), consistent with the large
literature describing the role of these regions in processing mon-
etary reward outcomes (Tricomi et al., 2004; Fliessbach et al.,
2007; Mobbs et al., 2009; Haber and Knutson, 2010; Kang et al.,
2013). Furthermore, the vmPFC showed an increased activation
to the equality in the outcomes between the players (Table 1), in
line with the results of previous studies reporting vmPFC activa-
tions to equitable monetary allocations between self and other
(Tabibnia et al., 2008; Tricomi et al., 2010; Baumgartner et al.,
2011; Zaki and Mitchell, 2011).
Neural response to opportunity stimulus
The neural responses to the opportunity stimuli were analyzed
using the same three-factor regression model as was used in the
analysis of subjective emotional pleasantness (Fig. 1C). The VS
showed significantly greater activation in response to an increas-
ing number of available options for SELF (Fig. 3B; OP_SELF: t(19)
 4.43, p	 0.001; one-sample t test). This VS activation was not
explained by the expected outcome values because the probabil-
ity and magnitude of the reward outcome was fixed across con-
ditions. The VS activation was not significantly modulated either
by the number of options forOTHER (OP_OTHER: t(19)0.10,
p  0.918) or by the choice equality (OP_EQUAL: t(19)  0.41,
p 0.690). We further examined whether interindividual varia-
tions in VS reactivity to the number of options were associated
with variations in self-reported emotional pleasantness. The sen-
sitivity of the VS activation to the number of options for SELF
with reference to that for OTHER (i.e., neural OP_SELF 
OP_OTHER) was positively correlated with that of the subjective
Figure 3. Neural responses in the VS. A, The VS as identified by the independent reward-localizer task. The VS was significantly activated ( p	 0.05, FWE-corrected within the VS anatomical
mask) during the MID task in response to potential monetary gains. Image is shown at a stringent threshold ( p	 0.0001, whole-brain FWE-corrected; k 10) for display. B, Activation in the VS
in response to the opportunity stimuli. Neural  values were averaged within a 6 mm radius sphere surrounding the peak voxel determined by the group-level random-effects analysis for the
reward-localizer task. Error bars depict SEM; *p	 0.05 (one-sample t test, two-tailed). C,D, Relations between neural responses and subjective emotional pleasantness sensitivities. The neural
for the number of options for SELFminus that for OTHER (OP_SELFOP_OTHER) was positively correlatedwith that derived from the subjective emotional pleasantness across participants (C). On
the other hand, the neural for choice equality (OP_EQUAL) was not correlatedwith that derived from the subjective emotional pleasantness (D). Pearson correlation coefficients (r) and associated
p values (two-tailed) are shown in the figure.
Figure4. Neural responses in the vmPFC.A, The vmPFCas identifiedby the independent reward-localizer task. The vmPFCwas significantly activated ( p	0.05, FWE-correctedwithin the vmPFC
anatomical mask) in response to monetary gain versus no-gain outcomes during the MID task. Image is thresholded at p	 0.001, uncorrected; k 10 for display. B, Activation in the vmPFC in
response to the opportunity stimuli. Neural  values were averaged within a 6-mm-radius sphere surrounding the peak voxel determined by group-level random-effects analysis for the
reward-localizer task. Error bars depict SEM; *p	 0.05 (one-sample t test, two-tailed). C,D, Relations between neural responses and subjective emotional pleasantness sensitivities. The neural
for the number of options for SELF minus that for OTHER (OP_SELFOP_OTHER) was not significantly correlated with that derived from the subjective emotional pleasantness across participants
(C). On the other hand, the neural for choice equality (OP_EQUAL) was positively correlated with that derived from subjective emotional pleasantness (D). Pearson correlation coefficients (r) and
associated p values (two-tailed) are shown in the figure.
Table 1. Neural responses to reward outcome in the two-person choice task
Region Contrast t p
VS (15, 11,5) OU_SELF 0 3.48 0.003
OU_OTHER 0 1.04 0.309
OU_EQUAL 0 0.92 0.368
vmPFC (9, 44,14) OU_SELF 0 2.67 0.015
OU_OTHER 0 0.58 0.567
OU_EQUAL 0 3.27 0.004
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emotional pleasantness (i.e., subjective emotional pleasantness
OP_SELF  OP_OTHER; derived from the regression analysis of
the subjective rating data) across participants (Fig. 3C; Pearson
correlation coefficient r  0.44, p  0.050; after controlling for
age and gender, r 0.44, p 0.069). In contrast, the sensitivity of
the VS activation to the choice equality (i.e., neural OP_EQUAL)
was not significantly correlated with that of the subjective emo-
tional pleasantness (i.e., subjective emotional pleasantness
OP_EQUAL; derived from the regression analysis of the subjective
rating data; Fig. 3D; r 0.04, p 0.858).
In contrast, the vmPFC activation significantly increased with
the choice equality (Fig. 4B; OP_EQUAL: t(19) 2.15, p 0.045),
but not with the number of available options for SELF (OP_SELF:
t(19) 0.26, p 0.801) or forOTHER (OP_OTHER: t(19)0.06,
p 0.950). In other words, the vmPFC activation was enhanced
when the options available to each of the two players were more
equal, regardless of the absolute number of options for each
player. Furthermore, the sensitivity of the vmPFC to the choice
equality (i.e., neural OP_EQUAL) was positively correlated with
the sensitivity of the subjective emotional pleasantness (i.e., sub-
jective emotional pleasantness OP_EQUAL) across participants
(Fig. 4D; r 0.47, p 0.034; after controlling for age and gender,
r  0.48, p  0.043). The vmPFC response to the number of
options for SELF with reference to that for OTHER (i.e., neural
OP_SELF OP_OTHER) was not significantly correlated with the
corresponding subjective emotional pleasantness (i.e., subjective
emotional pleasantness OP_SELF  OP_OTHER) across partici-
pants (Fig. 4C; r 0.17, p 0.484).
To examine whether neural activation patterns observed in
the VS and vmPFC were statistically different or not, we per-
formed a two-way ANOVA with region (VS or vmPFC) and re-
gressor (SELF or EQUAL) as within-subject factors.We found no
significant main effect of the region (F(1,19) 1.74, p 0.203) or
regressor (F(1,19) 2.65, p 0.120), but we did find a significant
interaction between the two factors (F(1,19)  19.9, p 	 0.001).
This significant region by regressor interaction confirmed a dif-
ferential activation pattern between the VS and vmPFC. Spe-
cifically, the VS is preferentially activated by the number of
options for participants themselves, whereas the vmPFC is pref-
erentially activated by the choice equality. To further characterize
the regional specificity,wealso lookedatbrainactivation inall voxels
within the combined anatomicalmask of VS and vmPFC.Whenwe
applied a statistical threshold equivalent to that used in the localizer-
based analysis (p	 0.05, uncorrected, without an extent threshold;
note that this analysis is not for statistical significance testing, but to
assess the spatial distributions of activated voxels), we found that all
voxels responding to the increasednumber of options for SELF (2
y 23 in theMNI coordinates) belonged to clusters in the bilateral
VS, whereas all voxels responding to the increased choice equality
(26  y  50 in the MNI coordinates) belonged to clusters in the
vmPFC. These results indicated a robust regional specificitywithout
any bias in voxel selection thatmight have been caused by the local-
izer task.
An exploratory whole-brain analysis identified significant ac-
tivation to the number of options for SELF in the several brain
areas outside the a priori regions-of-interest (Table 2). The neu-
ral responses to the number of options for OTHER and to the
choice equality were not significant outside the a priori regions of
interest (Table 2).
Does perceived probability of reward outcome explain VS
response to the number of options?
Although the objective probability of a reward outcomewas fixed
across conditions, there was a concern that a perceived bias in the
probability of a reward outcome had influenced theVS activation
to the number of options for SELF. However, the results of the
following additional analyses suggest that the observed VS acti-
vation is not explained by the perceived probability of a reward
outcome. First, before scanning, participants actively answered to
a question asking the probability of a reward outcome indepen-
dent of the number of options, confirming that they had explicit
knowledge about the objective probability (see Materials and
Methods). If participants still had an implicit belief that a larger
number of options was associated with a higher probability of a
reward outcome, the VS activation to the number of options for
SELF (i.e., the neural OP_SELF) should be largest in the first ses-
sion and decrease over the sessions, because participants would
learn through the experience that the number of options was not
related to the probability of a reward outcome.However, our data
indicates that this was not the case: There was no trend in the
Table 2. Significant activations identified by whole-brain analysis for the two-person choice task
Contrast Brain region (peak activation)
MNI coordinates
Peak Z
Cluster size
(no. voxels)x y z
OP_SELF 0 Occipital cortex (left) 27 73 37 5.19 2 (2720
a)
Supplementary motor area (right) 3 17 52 5.13 26 (2720a)
Occipital cortex (right) 15 103 4 4.94 2 (738)
Dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (left) 6 32 37 4.82 1 (2720a)
OP_OTHER 0 —
OP_EQUAL 0 —
OU_SELF 0 Occipital cortex (left) 27 103 1 5.35 20 (289)
Occipital cortex (right) 27 103 4 5.25 34 (462)
Posterior orbitofrontal cortex (right) 24 17 20 5.10 2 (568b)
VS (left) 12 5 14 4.93 6 (568b)
VS (right) 9 5 11 4.91 3 (568b)
Rostral anterior cingulate cortex (left) 3 41 7 4.89 1 (549)
Central orbitofrontal cortex (left) 36 35 11 4.84 1 (375)
OU_OTHER 0 —
OU_EQUAL 0 —
Results are based on a second-level random-effects analysis. Activationswere identified by a height threshold of p	 0.05, FWE-corrected across thewhole brain. Cluster sizes in the parentheses indicate the numbers of voxelswhen a height
threshold of p	 0.001, uncorrected, was applied.
aThese regions belonged to a single cluster.
bThese regions belonged to a single cluster.
No activation was found in the inversed contrasts.
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neural OP_SELF over the three sessions (F(2,38) 0.33, p 0.721,
one-way repeated-measures ANOVA with session as a factor;
Session 1: t(19)  3.00, p  0.007; Session 2: t(19)  1.92, p 
0.069; Session 3: t(19) 2.98, p 0.008), suggesting little effect of
learning on the VS response to the number of options for SELF.
The vmPFC response to the choice equality was also unchanged
over the session (F(2,38) 0.09, p 0.913).
Second, we examined whether the subjective value of the
number of options for SELF depended on the variance in per-
ceived probability of face-card appearance. The reason we as-
sessed the variance in the perceived probability is as follows: In
theory, if participants perceived that each option was associated
with different reward probabilities, they might think that a larger
number of available options would allow them to choose a “bet-
ter” option, thereby increasing the probability of obtaining a re-
ward. For instance, if participants perceived that the probabilities
of face-card appearance were 30, 40, 50, and 60% for the respec-
tive option positions, they might expect that the probability of
obtaining a reward would increase with the number of options
available (note that the theoretical increase in the probability of
obtaining a reward with the number of options would be the
same if the perceived probabilities of face-card appearance were,
for example, 60, 70, 80, and 90%; i.e., variance rather than max-
imum or mean is the determinant factor). In contrast, if another
participant perceived that the probabilities of face-card appear-
ance were 90% for all four option positions, they would not ex-
pect that the probability of obtaining a reward would depend on
the number of options available (because there were no better or
worse options). To assess the possible effect of the variance in
perceived option values on the subjective value of choice, we
asked participants after the scan to indicate their perceived prob-
ability (percentage of all trials) of face-card appearance for each
option position.Wedefined their answers as the perceived option
values, and calculated the perceived option-value variance (the
SD of the perceived option value among the four options). The
VS response (neural OP_SELF) for the participants who reported
no perceived option-value variance (i.e., the perceived option
values were 50% for all four options; n 10) was significant (t(9)
 2.51, p 0.034) and not statistically different from that for the
other participants (t(18)0.54, p 0.598; two-sample t test),
suggesting that the VS response to the number of options for
SELF was not due to the perceived variance in the option values.
The perceived option-value variance (mean SD across partic-
ipants 6.84 8.44) was not significantly correlatedwith the VS
response (neural OP_SELF; r 0.26, p 0.272) or with the sub-
jective valuation of the number of options for SELF (subjective
emotional pleasantness OP_SELF; r 0.31, p 0.182). Based on
these results, we concluded that the perceived variance in the
option values had little influence on the VS activation to the
number of options for SELF. The perceived option-value vari-
ance was also not significantly correlated with the vmPFC re-
sponse to the choice equality (neural OP_EQUAL; r  0.26, p 
0.266) or with the subjective valuation of the choice equality
(subjective emotional pleasantness OP_EQUAL; r  0.21, p 
0.376).
Discussion
The present study aimed to identify the neural substrate for sub-
jective value of equality in choice opportunity. We set up an
experimental situation in which participants compared their
number of available options with those of another. By using this
task procedure, we were able to probe specifically the value of
social equality in the number of options without confounding by
reward-outcome values or their equality. Our findings demon-
strate that the vmPFC showed greater activation as the number of
options between two players became equal. In contrast, the VS
activation increased with the absolute number of options avail-
able to participants themselves anddid not respond to the relative
equality between the players. These results suggest that the
vmPFC plays a critical role in subjective valuation of equality in
choice opportunity.
Although the importance of equal opportunity and its distinc-
tion from equal outcome have long been emphasized in the fields
of politics and economics (Arneson, 1989; Roemer, 2002; Breen,
2010), experimental research has never explored the neural basis
of how humans subjectively value equal opportunity. We found
that the vmPFC activation tracks the degree of equality in the
numbers of options between two people. This vmPFC activation
paralleled the result of self-reported emotional pleasantness,
which also increased with the relative equality in the number of
options. These findings suggest that the vmPFC, a region previ-
ously implicated in ethical judgment (Heekeren et al., 2003;
Prehn et al., 2008), plays an important role in valuation of equal-
ity in choice opportunity. Moreover, the vmPFC reactivity to
equality in the number of options varied across participants and
was positively correlated with the subjective emotional pleas-
antness sensitivity. The vmPFC reactivity might therefore re-
flect individual differences in the extent to which a person
values equality in choice opportunity. Thus, our subjective-
rating and neuroimaging results provide the first empirical
evidence that humans do value equality in choice opportunity
and that the specific neural substrate involved in its valuation
is the vmPFC.
In contrast to the vmPFC, activation in the VS did not reflect
the option-number equality between the players. Instead, the VS
activation increased with the number of options available to the
participants themselves, but not their partners. Importantly, the
VS activation was not explained by between-condition differ-
ences in the objective probabilities and risks of the reward out-
come, because these factors were fixed regardless of the number
of options. Our finding was consistent with recent fMRI studies
that reported greater striatal activation to a stimulus indicating
choice opportunity than to a stimulus indicating no choice, with-
out regard to the expected outcome value of a choice (Leotti and
Delgado, 2011; Fujiwara et al., 2013; Murayama et al., 2013).
These findings provide the neural evidence for the value of choice
opportunity, supporting the psychological literature describing
the beneficial effects of choice opportunity on decision-making
behaviors and subjective emotions (Suzuki, 2000; Tricomi et al.,
2004; Patall et al., 2008; Leotti et al., 2010; Fischer and Boer,
2011). Of note, unlike the previous study (Leotti and Delgado,
2011), we explicitly instructed our participants that the number
of optionswere irrelevant to the probability of obtaining a reward
outcome. In addition, the VS activation was significant already in
the initial session and unchanged over the experimental sessions,
suggesting that the value associated with the number of options
was little affected by learning from outcome feedback. Further-
more, the perceived variance in the probability of a reward out-
come among the options was not related to the VS activation
associated with the subjective value of the number of options.
These results may further indicate that the value of choice repre-
sented in the VS is distinct of the value of reward outcomes.
The differential activation pattern we observed between the
vmPFC and VS is notable. Specifically, the vmPFC activity re-
flected the degree of social equality (as indexed by similarity in
option numbers) between the two players, whereas the VS re-
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flected participants’ own number of options, regardless of how
many the other player had. These findings are consistent with the
idea that the vmPFC plays critical roles in processing social infor-
mation, which has been supported by patient studies demon-
strating that selective damages to the vmPFC cause the absence of
emotions involving social comparison (Koenigs and Tranel,
2007; Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2007) and a reduction in inferred
prosociality (Krajbich et al., 2009). Although fMRI studies have
frequently reported coactivations of the vmPFC and VS, these
two regions differentially contribute to value computation (Hare
et al., 2008; Basten et al., 2010; Philiastides et al., 2010). Recent
fMRI studies have begun to elucidate distinct roles of the vmPFC
and VS in processing social values (Mobbs et al., 2009; Cooper et
al., 2010; Zaki and Mitchell, 2011; Suzuki et al., 2012). For in-
stance, Suzuki et al. (2012) examined the neural representation of
reward values for self and others, and found that the vmPFC
encoded reward prediction error for both self and others, whereas
the VS encoded reward prediction error only for self, not for the
other person. Zaki and Mitchell (2011) examined the brain acti-
vation in a social decision-making task, and reported that the
activation to monetary outcomes in the vmPFC, but not in the
VS, was modulated by social contexts. Together, the vmPFC
seems to play a more important role than the VS in valuation of
social information including equality in opportunity. Mean-
while, some other studies have reported that the vmPFC and VS
show similar responses to social contexts (Tricomi et al., 2010;
Bault et al., 2011; Kang et al., 2013). Future research will benefit
from clarifying whether and how the vmPFC and VS are differ-
entially involved in reward processing within a range of social
contexts.
Several other patterns in our findings are also worth noting.
First, the fact that vmPFC activity was not modulated by the
choice opportunities of participants themselves is consistent with
fMRI studies that have investigated the effect of choice opportu-
nities on brain activation in nonsocial situations (Leotti and Del-
gado, 2011; Fujiwara et al., 2013). The vmPFC seems to be
important for how self-determined choice influences subjective
value of reward outcomes (Murayama et al., 2013), which should
be distinguished from the value of choice in itself. Second, our
behavioral results indicate that when the other player’s choice
opportunities increase, one’s own emotional pleasantness de-
creases, although no corresponding effect is observed in activa-
tion of the VS or vmPFC. This apparent discrepancy between
behavior and brain activation may be explained by differences
between the postscan subjective rating task and the fMRI task:
participants made active evaluations regarding the opportunity
stimuli and spent as much time as they needed to do so in the
postscan rating task, whereas they passively viewed the opportu-
nity stimuli for only a few seconds in the fMRI task. In a situation
like our fMRI task, individuals might focus primarily on features
that are salient to them, and it may be that only those features
affect subjective values. Our fMRI results imply that participants
focused predominantly on their own choice opportunities and
the choice equality between the players during the in-scanner
task. This interpretation accords with previous studies showing
that activation associated with subjective value in the reward sys-
tem is dramatically influenced by what participants attend to
(Hare et al., 2011; Lim et al., 2011). It is conceivable that the
number of options available to others would also modulate re-
ward system activity if participants were explicitly instructed to
pay attention to it, which could be tested in future research.
Third, we found that the sensitivity of subjective emotional pleas-
antness to the participants’ own choice opportunities markedly
varied across participants, and that the variation was greater than
that for sensitivity to the other player’s choice opportunities.
Other studies have suggested that the value of one’s own choice
opportunities may change depending on various psychological
factors such as depressed mood and susceptibility to illusion of
control (Taylor and Brown, 1988; Leotti et al., 2010). Interest-
ingly, these factors can have a greater influence on the value of
one’s own choice than on those of others (Golin et al., 1979),
which may underlie our finding that interindividual variation in
sensitivity of subjective emotional pleasantness to choice oppor-
tunity was larger when considering the participants’ own number
of options than those of the other players.
To conclude, our study demonstrates that the vmPFC, which
has been implicated in reward-related information processing in
a variety of situations, is also involved in valuation of social equal-
ity in choice opportunity. Although several animals seem to be
sensitive to fairness and equality in reward outcomes (Brosnan,
2006; Range et al., 2009; Proctor et al., 2013), only humans care
about equality in choice opportunity, a distinctive dimension of
social equality that has been developed and enforced by modern
social-cultural systems (Be´teille, 1986, 1994; Buckholtz and Ma-
rois, 2012). The ability to value both equal opportunity and equal
outcome and to take balance between themmay be a hallmark of
the ethical andmoral sense that is uniquely human. Our findings
may shed light on how a subjective value of equality in choice
opportunity emerged in the human brain.
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